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ABSTRACT
Privacy definitions provide ways for trading-off the privacy
of individuals in a statistical database for the utility of down-
stream analysis of the data. In this paper, we present Blow-
fish, a class of privacy definitions inspired by the Pufferfish
framework, that provides a rich interface for this trade-off.
In particular, we allow data publishers to extend differential
privacy using a policy, which specifies (a) secrets, or informa-
tion that must be kept secret, and (b) constraints that may
be known about the data. While the secret specification
allows increased utility by lessening protection for certain
individual properties, the constraint specification provides
added protection against an adversary who knows correla-
tions in the data (arising from constraints). We formalize
policies and present novel algorithms that can handle general
specifications of sensitive information and certain count con-
straints. We show that there are reasonable policies under
which our privacy mechanisms for k-means clustering, his-
tograms and range queries introduce significantly lesser noise
than their differentially private counterparts. We quantify
the privacy-utility trade-offs for various policies analytically
and empirically on real datasets.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2.8 [Database Applications]: Statistical Databases; K.4.1
[Computers and Society]: Privacy
Keywords
privacy, differential privacy, Blowfish privacy
1. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing popularity of “big-data” applications
which collect, analyze and disseminate individual level in-
formation in literally every aspect of our life, ensuring that
these applications do not breach the privacy of individuals is
an important problem. The last decade has seen the devel-
opment of a number of privacy definitions and mechanisms
that trade-off the privacy of individuals in these databases
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for the utility (or accuracy) of data analysis (see [4] for a
survey). Differential privacy [6] has emerged as a gold stan-
dard not only because it is not susceptible to attacks that
other definition can’t tolerate, but also since it provides a
simple knob, namely , for trading off privacy for utility.
While  is intuitive, it does not sufficiently capture the
diversity in the privacy-utility trade-off space. For instance,
recent work has shown two seemingly contradictory results.
In certain applications (e.g., social recommendations [17])
differential privacy is too strong and does not permit suffi-
cient utility. Next, when data are correlated (e.g., when con-
straints are known publicly about the data, or in social net-
work data) differentially private mechanisms may not limit
the ability of an attacker to learn sensitive information [12].
Subsequently, Kifer and Machanavajjhala [13] proposed a
semantic privacy framework, called Pufferfish, which helps
clarify assumptions underlying privacy definitions – specif-
ically, the information that is being kept secret, and the
adversary’s background knowledge. They showed that dif-
ferential privacy is equivalent to a specific instantiation of
the Pufferfish framework, where (a) every property about
an individual’s record in the data is kept secret, and (b) the
adversary assumes that every individual is independent of
the rest of the individuals in the data (no correlations). We
believe that these shortcomings severely limit the applicabil-
ity of differential privacy to real world scenarios that either
require high utility, or deal with correlated data.
Inspired by Pufferfish, we seek to better explore the trade-
off between privacy and utility by providing a richer set of
“tuning knobs”. We explore a class of definitions called Blow-
fish privacy. In addition to , which controls the amount of
information disclosed, Blowfish definitions take as input a
privacy policy that specifies two more parameters – which
information must be kept secret about individuals, and what
constraints may be known publicly about the data. By ex-
tending differential privacy using these policies, we can hope
to develop mechanisms that permit more utility since not all
properties of an individual need to be kept secret. Moreover,
we also can limit adversarial attacks that leverage correla-
tions due to publicly known constraints.
We make the following contributions in this paper:
• We introduce and formalize sensitive information speci-
fications, constraints, policies and Blowfish privacy. We
consider a number of realistic examples of sensitive in-
formation specification, and focus on count constraints.
• We show how to adapt well known differential privacy
mechanisms to satisfy Blowfish privacy, and using the
example of k-means clustering illustrate the gains in ac-
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curacy for Blowfish policies having weaker sensitive in-
formation specifications.
• We propose the ordered mechanism, a novel strategy
for releasing cumulative histograms and answering range
queries. We show analytically and using experiments on
real data that, for reasonable sensitive information spec-
ifications, the ordered hierarchical mechanism is more
accurate than the best known differentially private mech-
anisms for these workloads.
• We study how to calibrate noise for policies expressing
count constraints, and its applications in several practi-
cal scenarios.
Organization: Section 2 introduces the notation. Section 3
formalizes privacy policies. We define Blowfish privacy, and
discuss composition properties and its relationship to prior
work in Section 4. We define the policy specific global sen-
sitivity of queries in Section 5. We describe mechanisms
for kmeans clustering (Section 6), and releasing cumula-
tive histograms & answering range queries (Section 7) under
Blowfish policies without constraints and empirically evalu-
ate the resulting privacy-utility trade-offs on real datasets.
We show how to release histograms in the presence of count
constraints in Section 8 and then conclude in Section 9.
2. NOTATION
We consider a dataset D consisting of n tuples. Each tuple
t is considered to be drawn from a domain T = A1 × A2 ×
. . .×Am constructed from the cross product of m categorical
attributes. We assume that each tuple t corresponds to the
data collected from a unique individual with identifier t. id.
We will use the notation x ∈ T to denote a value in the
domain, and x.Ai to denote the i
th attribute value in x.
Throughout this paper, we will make an assumption that
the set of individuals in the dataset D is known in advance
to the adversary and does not change. Hence we will use
the indistinguishability notion of differential privacy [7]. We
will denote the set of possible databases using In, or the set
of databases with |D| = n.1
Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy [6]). Two
datasets D1 and D2 are neighbors, denoted by (D1, D2) ∈
N , if they differ in the value of one tuple. A randomized
mechanism M satisfies -differential privacy if for every set
of outputs S ⊆ range(M), and every pair of neighboring
datasets (D1, D2) ∈ N ,
Pr[M(D1) ∈ S] ≤ ePr[M(D2) ∈ S] (1)
Many techniques that satisfy differential privacy use the
following notion of global sensitivity:
Definition 2.2 (Global Sensitivity). The global sen-
sitivity of a function f : In → Rd, denoted by S(f) is defined
as the largest L1 difference ||f(D1)−f(D2)||1, where D1 and
D2 are databases that differ in one tuple. More formally,
S(f) = max
(D1,D2)∈N
||f(D1)− f(D2)||1 (2)
A popular technique that satisfies -differential privacy is
the Laplace mechanism [7] defined as follows:
1In Sec. 3 we briefly discuss how to generalize our results to other
differential privacy notions by relaxing this assumption.
Definition 2.3. The Laplace mechanism, MLap, privately
computes a function f : In → Rd by computing f(D) + η.
η ∈ Rd is a vector of independent random variables, where
each ηi is drawn from the Laplace distribution with parame-
ter S(f)/. That is, P [ηi = z] ∝ e−z·/S(f).
Given some partitioning of the domain P = (P1, . . . , Pk),
we denote by hP : I → Zk the histogram query. hP(D)
outputs for each Pi the number of times values in Pi appears
inD. hT (·) (or h(·) in short) is the complete histogram query
that reports for each x ∈ T the number of times it appears
in D. It is easy to see that S(hP) = 2 for all histogram
queries, and the Laplace mechanism adds noise proportional
to Lap(2/) to each component of the histogram. We will
use Mean Squared Error as a measure of accuracy/error.
Definition 2.4. Let M be a randomized algorithm that
privately computes a function f : In → Rd. The expected
mean squared error of M is given by:
EM (D) =
∑
i
E(fi(D)− f˜i(D))2 (3)
where fi(·) and f˜i(·) denote the ith component of the true
and noisy answers, respectively.
Under this definition the accuracy of the Laplace mechanism
for histograms is given by |T | · E(Laplace(2/))2 = 8|T |/2.
3. POLICY DRIVEN PRIVACY
In this section, we describe an abstraction called a policy
that helps specify which information has to be kept secret
and what background knowledge an attacker may possess
about the correlations in the data. We will use this policy
specification as input in our privacy definition, called Blow-
fish, described in Section 4.
3.1 Sensitive Information
As indicated by the name, Blowfish2 privacy is inspired by
the Pufferfish privacy framework [13]. In fact, we will show
later (in Section 4.2) that Blowfish privacy is equivalent to
specific instantiations of semantic definitions arising from
the Pufferfish framework.
Like Pufferfish, Blowfish privacy also uses the notions of
secrets and discriminative pairs of secrets. We define a se-
cret to be an arbitrary propositional statement over the val-
ues in the dataset. For instance, the secret s : t. id =
‘Bob’∧ t.Disease = ‘Cancer’ is true in a dataset where Bob
has Cancer. We denote by S a set of secrets that the data
publisher would like to protect. As we will see in this section
each individual may have multiple secrets. Secrets may also
pertain to sets of individuals. For instance, the following
secret s : t1. id = ‘Alice’ ∧ t2. id = ‘Bob’ ∧ t1.Disease =
t2.Disease is true when Alice and Bob have the same dis-
ease. However, in this paper, we focus on the case where
each secret is about a single individual.
We call a pair of secrets (s, s′) ∈ S × S discriminative if
they are mutually exclusive. Each discriminative pair de-
scribes properties that an adversary must not be able to
distinguish between. One input to a policy is a set of dis-
criminative pairs of secrets Spairs.
We now present a few examples of sensitive information
specified as a set of discriminative secrets.
2Pufferfish and Blowfish are common names of the same family
of marine fish, Tetraodontidae.
• Full Domain: Let six be the secret (t. id = i∧ t = x), for
some x ∈ T . We define Sfullpairs as:
Sfullpairs = {(six, siy)|∀i,∀(x, y) ∈ T × T } (4)
This means that for every individual, an adversary should
not be able to distinguish whether that individual’s value
is x or y, for all x, y ∈ T .
• Attributes: Let x ∈ T denote a multidimensional value.
Let x[A] denote value of attribute A, and x[A¯] the value
for the other attributes. Then a second example of sen-
sitive information is:
Sattrpairs = {(six, siy)|∀i,∃A,x[A] 6= y[A] ∧ x[A¯] = y[A¯]}
(5)
Sattrpairs ensures that an adversary should not be able to
sufficiently distinguish between any two values for each
attribute of every individual’s value.
• Partitioned: Let P = {P1, . . . , Pp} be a partition that
divides the domain into p disjoint sets (∪iPi = T and
∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ p, Pi ∩ Pj = ∅). We define partitioned sensi-
tive information as:
SPpairs = {(six, siy)|∀i,∃j, (x, y) ∈ Pj × Pj} (6)
In this case, an adversary is allowed to deduce whether
an individual is in one of two different partitions, but
can’t distinguish between two values within a single par-
tition. This is a natural specification for location data –
an individual may be OK with releasing his/her location
at a coarse granularity (e.g., a coarse grid), but location
within each grid cell must be hidden from the adversary.
• Distance Threshold: In many situations there is an inher-
ent distance metric d associated with the points in the
domain (e.g., L1 distance on age or salary, or Manhat-
tan distance on locations). Rather than requiring that
an adversary should not be able to distinguish between
any pairs of points x and y, one could require that each
pair of points that are close are not distinguishable. So,
for this purpose, the set of discriminative secrets is:
Sd,θpairs = {(six, siy)|∀i, d(x, y) ≤ θ} (7)
Under this policy, the adversary will not be able to dis-
tinguish any pair of values with certainty. However, the
adversary may distinguish points that are farther apart
better that points that are close.
All of the above specifications of sensitive information can
be generalized using the discriminative secret graph, defined
below. Consider a graph G = (V,E), where V = T and
the set of edges E ⊆ T × T . The set of edges can be inter-
preted as values in the domain that an adversary must not
distinguish between; i.e., the set of discriminative secrets is
SGpairs = {(six, siy) | ∀i,∀(x, y) ∈ E}. The above examples
correspond to the following graphs: Gfull corresponds to a
complete graph on all the elements in T . Gattr corresponds
to a graph where two values are connected by an edge when
only one attribute value changes. GP has |P| connected
components, where each component is a complete graph on
vertices in Pi. Finally, in G
d,θ, (x, y) ∈ E iff d(x, y) ≤ θ.
We would like to note that a policy could have secrets
and discriminative pairs about sets of individuals. However,
throughout this paper, we only consider secrets pertaining
to a single individual, and thus discriminative pairs refer
to two secrets about the same individual. Additionally, the
set of discriminative pairs is the same for all individuals.
One can envision different individuals having different sets
of discriminative pairs. For instance, we can model an in-
dividual who is privacy agnostic and does not mind disclos-
ing his/her value exactly by having no discriminative pair
involving that individual. Finally note that in all of the
discussion in this section, the specification of what is sen-
sitive information does not depend on the original database
D. One could specify sensitive information that depends on
D, but one must be wary that this might leak additional
information to an adversary. In this paper, we focus on
data-independent discriminative pairs, uniform secrets and
secrets that only pertain to single individuals.
Throughout this paper, we will assume that the adversary
knows the total number of tuples in the database (i.e., the
set of possible instances is In). Hence, we can limit our-
selves to considering changes in tuples (and not additions or
deletions). We can in principle relax this assumption about
cardinality, by adding an additional set of secrets of the form
si⊥ which mean “individual i is not in dataset”. All of our
definitions and algorithms can be modified to handle this
case by adding ⊥ to the domain and to the discriminative
secret graph G. We defer these extensions to future work.
3.2 Auxiliary Knowledge
Recent work [12] showed that differentially private mecha-
nisms could still lead to an inordinate disclosure of sensitive
information when adversaries have access to publicly known
constraints about the data that induce correlations across
tuples. This can be illustrated by the following example.
Consider a table D with one attribute R that takes values
r1, . . . , rk. Suppose, based on publicly released datasets the
following k−1 constraints are already known: c(r1)+c(r2) =
a1, c(r2) + c(r3) = a2, and so on, where c(ri) is the number
of records with value ri. This does not provide enough infor-
mation to always reconstruct the counts in D (k unknowns
but k−1 linear equations). However, if we knew the answer
to some c(ri), then all counts can be reconstructed – in this
way tuples are correlated.
Differential privacy allows answering all the count queries
c(ri) by adding independent noise with variance 2/
2 to each
count. While these noisy counts c˜(ri) themselves do not dis-
close information about any individual, they can be com-
bined with the constraints to get very precise estimates of
c(ri). That is, we can construct k independent estimators
for each count as follow. For r1, c˜(r1), a1 − c˜(r2), a1 − a2 +
c˜(r3), . . . each equal c(r1) in expectation and have a variance
of 2/2. By averaging these estimators, we can predict the
value of c(ri) with a variance of 2/(k
2). For large k (e.g.,
when there are 2d values in R), the variance is small so that
the table D is reconstructed with very high probability, thus
causing a complete breach of privacy.
Therefore, our policy specification also takes into account
auxiliary knowledge that an adversary might know about the
individuals in the private database. In Blowfish, we consider
knowledge in the form of a set of deterministic constraints Q
that are publicly known about the dataset. We believe these
are easier to specify than probabilistic correlation functions
for data publishers. The effect of the constraints in Q is
to make only a subset of the possible database instances
IQ ⊂ In possible; or equivalently, all instances in In \ IQ
are impossible. For any database D ∈ In, we denote by
D ` Q if D satisfies the constraints in Q; i.e., D ∈ IQ.
Examples of deterministic constraints include:
• Count Query Constraints: A count query on a database
returns the number of tuples that satisfy a certain pred-
icate. A count query constraints is a set of (count query,
answer) pairs over the database that are publicly known.
• Marginal Constraints: A marginal is a projection of the
database on a subset of attributes, and each row counts
the number of tuples that agree on the subset of at-
tributes. The auxiliary knowledge of marginals means
these database marginals are known to the adversary.
3.3 Policy
Definition 3.1 (Policy). A policy is a triple
P = (T , G, IQ), where G = (V,E) is a discriminative secret
graph with V ⊆ T . In P , the set of discriminative pairs
SGpairs is defined as the set {(six, siy) | ∀i ∈ id, ∀(x, y) ∈ E},
where six denotes the statement: t. id = i∧t = x. IQ denotes
the set of databases that are possible under the constraints
Q that are known about the database.
Note that the description of the policy can be exponen-
tial in the size of the input dataset. We will use short-
hand to describe certain types of sensitive information (e.g.,
full domain, partition, etc), and specify the set of possible
databases IQ using the description of Q.
4. BLOWFISH PRIVACY
In this section, we present our new privacy definition,
called Blowfish Privacy. Like differential privacy, Blowfish
uses the notion of neighboring datasets. The key difference
is that the set of neighbors in Blowfish depend on the policy
P – both on the set of discriminative pairs as well as on the
constraints known about the database.
Definition 4.1 (Neighbors). Let P = (T , G, IQ) be
a policy. For any pair of datasets D1, D2, let T (D1, D2) ⊆
SGpairs be the set of discriminative pairs (six, siy) such that the
ith tuples in D1 and D2 are x and y, resp. Let ∆(D1, D2) =
D1 \D2 ∪D2 \D1. D1 and D2 are neighbors with respect to
a policy P , denoted by (D1, D2) ∈ N(P ), if:
1. D1, D2 ∈ IQ. (i.e., both the datasets satisfy Q).
2. T 6= ∅. (i.e., ∃(six, siy) ∈ SGpairs such that the ith tuples
in D1 and D2 are x and y, resp).
3. There is no database D3 ` Q such that
(a) T (D1, D3) ⊂ T (D1, D2), or
(b) T (D1, D3) = T (D1, D2) & ∆(D3, D1) ⊂ ∆(D2, D1).
When P = (T , G, In) (i.e., no constraints), D1 and D2 are
neighbors if some individual tuples value is changed from
x to y, where (x, y) is an edge in G. Note that T (D1, D2)
is non-empty and has the smallest size (of 1). Neighboring
datasets in differential privacy correspond to neighbors when
G is a complete graph.
For policies having constraints, conditions 1 and 2 ensure
that neighbors satisfy the constraints (i.e., are in IQ), and
that they differ in at least one discriminative pair of secrets.
Condition 3 ensures that D1 and D2 are minimally different
in terms of discriminative pairs and tuple changes.
Definition 4.2 (Blowfish Privacy). Let  > 0 be a
real number and P = (T , G, IQ) be a policy. A randomized
mechanism M satisfies (, P )-Blowfish privacy if for every
pair of neighboring databases (D1, D2) ∈ N(P ), and every
set of outputs S ⊆ range(M), we have
Pr[M(D1) ∈ S] ≤ ePr[M(D2) ∈ S] (8)
Note that Blowfish privacy takes in the policy P in addition
to  as an input, and is different from differential privacy
in only the set of neighboring databases N(P ). For P =
(T , G, In) (i.e., no constraints), it is easy to check that for
any two databases that arbitrarily differ in one tuple (D1 =
D ∪ {x}, D2 = D ∪ {y}), and any set of outputs S,
Pr[M(D1) ∈ S] ≤ e·dG(x,y)Pr[M(D2) ∈ S] (9)
where dG(x, y) is the shortest distance between x, y in G.
This implies that an attacker may better distinguish pairs
of points farther apart in the graph (e.g., values with many
differing attributes in Sattrpairs), than those that are closer.
Similarly, an attack can distinguish between x, y with prob-
ability 1, when x and y appear in different partitions under
partitioned sensitive information SPpairs (dG(x, y) =∞).
4.1 Composition
Composition [8] is an important property that any privacy
notion should satisfy in order to be able to reason about
independent data releases. Sequential composition ensures
that a sequence of computations that each ensure privacy
in isolation also ensures privacy. This allows breaking down
computations into smaller building blocks. Parallel compo-
sition is crucial to ensure that too much error is not intro-
duced on computations occurring on disjoint subsets of data.
We can show that Blowfish satisfies sequential composition,
and a weak form of parallel composition.
Theorem 4.1 (Sequential Composition). Let P =
(T , G, IQ) be a policy and D ∈ IQ be an input database. Let
M1(·) and M2(·, ·) be algorithms with independent sources of
randomness that satisfy (1, P ) and (2, P )-Blowfish privacy,
resp. Then an algorithm that outputs both M1(D) = ω1 and
M2(ω1, D) = ω2 satisfies (1 + 2, P )-Blowfish privacy.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem 4.2. (Parallel Composition with Cardi-
nality Constraint). Let P = (T , G, In) be a policy where
the cardinality of the input D ∈ In is known. Let S1, . . . , Sp
be disjoint subsets of ids; D ∩ Si denotes the dataset re-
stricted to the individuals in Si. Let Mi be mechanisms that
each ensure (i, P )-Blowfish privacy. Then the sequence of
Mi(D ∩ Si) ensures (maxi i, P )-Blowfish privacy.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Reasoning about parallel composition in the presence of
general constraints is non-trivial. Consider two neighbor-
ing datasets Da, Db ∈ N(P ). For instance, suppose one of
the attributes is gender, we know the number of males and
females in the dataset, and we are considering full domain
sensitive information. Then there exist neighboring datasets
such that differ in two tuples i and j that are alternately
male and female in Da and Db. If i and j appear in differ-
ent subsets S1 and S2 resp., then Da ∩ S1 6= Db ∩ S2 and
Da ∩ S1 6= Db ∩ S2. Thus the sequence Mi(D ∩ Si) does
not ensure (maxi i, P )-Blowfish privacy. We generalize this
observation below.
Define a pair of secrets (s, s′) to be critical to a constraint
q if there exist Ds, Ds′ such that T (Ds, Ds′) = (s, s
′), and
Ds ` q, but Ds′ 6` q. Let crit(q) denote the set of secret
pairs that are critical to q. Next, consider S1, . . . , Sk disjoint
subsets of ids. We denote by SP (Si) the set of secret pairs
that pertain to the ids in Si. We say that a constraint q
affects D ∩ Si if crit(q) ∩ SP (Si) 6= ∅. We can now state a
sufficient condition for parallel composition.
Theorem 4.3. (Parallel Composition with General
Constraints). Let P = (T , G, IQ) be a policy and S1, . . . , Sp
be disjoint subsets of ids. Let Mi be mechanisms that each
ensure (i, P )-Blowfish privacy. Then the sequence of Mi(D∩
Si) ensures (maxi i, P )-Blowfish privacy if there exist dis-
joint subsets of constraints Q1, . . . , Qp ⊂ Q such that all the
constraints in Qi only affects D ∩ Si.
Proof. See Appendix C.
We conclude this section with an example of parallel compo-
sition. Suppose G contains two disconnected components on
nodes S and T \S. The set of all secret pairs correspond to
pairs of values that come either from S or from T \ S. Sup-
pose we know two count constraints qS and qT \S that count
the number of tuples with values in S and T \S, respectively.
It is easy to see that crit(qS) = crit(qT \S) = 0. Therefore,
running an (, (T , G, {qS , qT \S}))-Blowfish private mecha-
nism on disjoint subsets results in no loss of privacy.
4.2 Relation to other definitions
In this section, we relate Blowfish privacy to existing no-
tions of privacy. We discuss variants of differential privacy
[6] (including restricted sensitivity [1]), the Pufferfish frame-
work [13], privacy axioms [11], and a recent independent
work on extending differential privacy with metrics [3].
Differential Privacy [6]: One can easily verify that a
mechanism satisfies -differential privacy (Definition 2.1) if
and only if it satisfies (, P )-Blowfish privacy, where P =
(T ,K, In), and K is the complete graph on the domain.
Thus, Blowfish privacy is a generalization of differential pri-
vacy that allows a data curator to trade-off privacy vs utility
by controlling sensitive information G (instead of K) and
auxiliary knowledge IQ (instead of In) in the policy.
Pufferfish Framework [13, 14]: Blowfish borrows the
sensitive information specification from Pufferfish. Puffer-
fish defines adversarial knowledge using a set of data gen-
erating distributions, while Blowfish instantiates the same
using publicly known constraints. We can show formal re-
lationships between Blowfish and Pufferfish instantiations.
Theorem 4.4. Let Spairs be the set of discriminative pairs
corresponding to policy P = (T , G, In). Let D denote the
set of all product distributions {pi(·)}i over n tuples. pi(·)
denotes a probability distribution for tuple i over T . Then
a mechanism satisfies (,Spairs,D)-Pufferfish privacy if and
only if it satisfies (, P )-Blowfish privacy.
Theorem 4.5. Consider a policy P = (T , G, IQ) corre-
sponding to a set of constraints Q. Let Spairs be defined as
in Theorem 4.4. Let DQ be the set of product distributions
conditioned on the constraints in Q; i.e.,
P [D = x1, . . . , xk] ∝
{ ∏
i pi(xi) if D ∈ IQ
0 otherwise
A mechanism M that satisfies (,Spairs,DQ)-Pufferfish pri-
vacy also satisfies (, P )-Blowfish privacy.
Theorem 4.4 states that Blowfish policies without constraints
are equivalent to Pufferfish instantiated using adversaries
who believe tuples in D are independent (proof follows from
Theorem 6.1 [14]). Theorem 4.5 states that when constraints
are known, Blowfish is a necessary condition for any mecha-
nism that satisfies a similar Pufferfish instantiation with con-
straints (we conjecture the sufficiency of Blowfish as well).
Thus Blowfish privacy policies correspond to a subclass of
privacy definitions that can be instantiated using Pufferfish.
Both Pufferfish and Blowfish aid the data publisher to
customize privacy definitions by carefully defining sensitive
information and adversarial knowledge. However, Blowfish
improves over Pufferfish in three key aspects. First, there are
no general algorithms known for Pufferfish instantiations.
In this paper, we present of algorithms for various Blowfish
policies. Thus, we can’t compare Blowfish and Pufferfish
experimentally. Second, all Blowfish privacy policies result
in composable privacy definitions. This is not true for the
Pufferfish framework. Finally, we believe Blowfish privacy
is easier to understand and use than the Pufferfish frame-
work for data publishers who are not privacy experts.3 For
instance, one needs to specify adversarial knowledge as sets
of complex probability distributions in Pufferfish, while in
Blowfish policies one only needs to specify conceptually sim-
pler publicly known constraints.
Other Privacy Definitions: Kifer and Lin [11] stipulate
that every “good” privacy definition should satisfy two ax-
ioms – transformation invariance, and convexity. We can
show that Blowfish privacy satisfy both these axioms.
Recent papers have extended differential privacy to handle
constraints. Induced neighbor privacy [12, 13] extends the
notion of neighbors such that neighboring databases satisfy
the constraints and are minimally far apart (in terms of tuple
changes). Blowfish extends this notion of induced neighbors
to take into account discriminative pairs of secrets and mea-
sures distance in terms of the set of different discriminative
pairs. Restricted sensitivity [1] extends the notion of sensi-
tivity to account for constraints. In particular, the restricted
sensitivity of a function f given a set of constraints Q, or
RSf (Q), is the maximum |f(D1) − f(D2)|/d(D1, D2), over
all D1, D2 ∈ IQ. However, tuning noise to RSf (Q) may not
limit the ability of an attacker to learn sensitive information.
For instance, if IQ = {0n, 1n}, then the restricted sensitiv-
ity of releasing the number of 1s is 1. Adding constant noise
does not disallow the adversary from knowing whether the
database was 0n or 1n.
A very recent independent work suggests extending dif-
ferential privacy using a metric over all possible databases
[3]. In particular, given a distance metric d over instances,
they require an algorithm to ensure that P [M(X) ⊆ S] ≤
e·d(X,Y )P [M(Y ) ⊆ S], for all sets of outputs S and all in-
stances X and Y . Thus differential privacy corresponds to
a specific distance measure – Hamming distance. The sensi-
tive information specification in Blowfish can also be thought
of in terms of a distance metric over tuples. In addition
we present novel algorithms (ordered mechanism) and allow
incorporating knowledge of constraints. We defer a more
detailed comparison to future work.
3We have some initial anecdotal evidence of this fact working
with statisticians from the US Census.
5. BLOWFISH WITHOUT CONSTRAINTS
Given any query f that outputs a vector of reals, we can
define a policy specific sensitivity of f . Thus, the Laplace
mechanism with noise calibrated to the policy specific sen-
sitivity ensures Blowfish privacy.
Definition 5.1. (Policy Specific Global Sensitiv-
ity). Given a policy (T , G, IQ), S(f, P ) denotes the policy
specific global sensitivity of a function f and is defined as
max(D1,D2)∈N(P ) ||f(D1)− f(D2)||1.
Theorem 5.1. Let P = (T , G, IQ) be a policy. Given a
function f : IQ → Rd, outputting f(D) + η ensures (, P )-
Blowfish privacy if η ∈ Rd is a vector of independent random
numbers drawn from Lap(S(f, p)/).
When policies do not have constraints (P = (T , G, In)),
(, P )-Blowfish differs from -differential privacy only in the
specification of sensitive information. Note that every pair
(D1, D2) ∈ N(P ) differ in only one tuple when P has no
constraints. Therefore, the following result trivially holds.
Lemma 5.2. Any mechanism M that satisfies
-differential privacy also satisfies (, (T , G, In))-Blowfish pri-
vacy for all discriminative secret graphs G.
The proof follows from the fact that -differential privacy
is equivalent to (, (T ,K, In))-Blowfish privacy, where K is
the complete graph.
In many cases, we can do better in terms of utility than
differentially privacy mechanisms. It is easy to see that
S(f, P ) is never larger than the global sensitivity S(f). There-
fore, just using the Laplace mechanism with S(f, P ) can
provide better utility.
For instance, consider a linear sum query fw =
∑n
i=1 wixi,
where w ∈ Rn is a weight vector, and each value xi ∈ T =
[a, b]. For Gfull, the policy specific sensitivity is (b − a) ·
(maxi wi) the same as the global sensitivity. For G
d,θ, where
d(x, y) = |x−y|, the policy specific sensitivity is θ·(maxi wi),
which can be much smaller than the global sensitivity when
θ  (b− a).
As a second example, suppose P is a partitioning of the
domain. If the policy specifies sensitive information parti-
tioned by P (GP), then the policy specific sensitivity of hP
is 0. That is, the histogram of P or any coarser partitioning
can be released without any noise. We will show more ex-
amples of improved utility under Blowfish policies in Sec 5.
However, for histogram queries, the policy specific sensi-
tivity for most reasonable policies (with no constraints) is 2,
the same as global sensitivity.4 Thus, it cannot significantly
improve the accuracy for histogram queries.
Next, we present examples of two analysis tasks – k-means
clustering (Section 6), and releasing cumulative histograms
(Section 7)– for which we can design mechanisms for Blow-
fish policies without constraints with more utility (lesser er-
ror) than mechanisms that satisfy differential privacy. In
k-means clustering we will see that using Blowfish policies
helps reduce the sensitivity of intermediate queries on the
data. In the case of the cumulative histogram workload, we
can identify novel query answering strategies given a Blow-
fish policy that helps reduce the error.
4The one exception is partitioned sensitive information.
6. K-MEANS CLUSTERING
K-means clustering is widely used in many applications
such as classification and feature learning. It aims to cluster
proximate data together and is formally defined below.
Definition 6.1 (K-means clustering). Given a data
set of n points (t1, ..., tn) ∈ T n, k-means clustering aims to
partition the points into k ≤ n clusters S = {S1, ..., Sk} in
order to minimize
k∑
i=1
∑
tj∈Si
||tj − µi||2, (10)
where µi =
1
|Si|
∑
tj∈Si tj, and ||x− y|| denotes L2 distance.
The non-private version of k-means clustering initializes
the means/centroids (µ1, ..., µk) (e.g. randomly) and up-
dates them iteratively as follows: 1) assign each point to the
nearest centroid; 2) recompute the centroid of each cluster,
until reaching some convergence criterion or a fixed number
of iterations.
The first differentially private k-means clustering algo-
rithm was proposed by Blum et al. [2] as SuLQ k-means.
Observe that only two queries are required explicitly: 1) the
number of points in each new cluster, qsize = (|S1|, ..., |Sk|)
and 2) the sum of the data points for each cluster, qsum =
(
∑
tj∈S1 tj , ...,
∑
tj∈Sk tj), to compute the centroid. The
sensitivity of qsize is 2 (same as a histogram query). Let
d(T ) denote the diameter of the domain, or the largest L1
distance (||x − y||1) between any two points x, y ∈ T . The
sensitivity of qsum could be as large as the diameter 2 · d(T )
since a tuple from x to y can only change the sums for two
clusters by at most d(T ).
Under Blowfish privacy policies, the policy specific sensi-
tivity of qsum can be much smaller than |T | under Differen-
tial privacy (i.e. complete graph Gfull for Blowfish policies).
Since qsize is the histogram query, the sensitivity of qsize un-
der Blowfish is also 2.
Lemma 6.1. Policy specific global sensitivities of qsum un-
der the attribute Gattr, L1-distance G
(L1,θ), and partition
GP discriminative graphs (from Section 3) are smaller than
the global sensitivity of qsum under differential privacy.
Proof. First, in the attribute discriminative graph Gattr,
edges correspond to (x, y) ∈ T ×T that differ only in any one
attribute. Thus, if |A| denotes maximum distance between
two elements in A, then the policy specific sensitivity of
qsum under G
attr is maxA(2 · |A|) < 2 · d(T ). Next, suppose
we use GL1,θ, where x, y ∈ T are connected by an edge if
||x− y||1 ≤ θ. Thus, policy specific sensitivity of qsum is 2θ.
Finally, consider the policy specified using the partitioned
sensitive graphGP , where P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pk} is some data
independent partitioning of the domain T . Here, an adver-
sary should not distinguish between an individual’s tuple
taking a pair of values x, y ∈ T only if x and y appear in
the same partition Pi for some i. Under this policy the sen-
sitivity of qsum is at most maxP∈P 2 · d(P ) < 2 · d(T ).
Thus, by Theorem 5.1, we can use the SULQ k-means
mechanism with the appropriate policy specific sensitivity
for qsum (from Lemma 6.1) and thus satisfy privacy under
the Blowfish policy while ensuring better accuracy.
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Figure 1: K-Means: Error under Laplace mechanism v.s Blowfish privacy for different discriminative graphs.
6.1 Empirical Evaluation
We empirically evaluate the accuracy of k-means cluster-
ing for (, (T , G, In))-Blowfish privacy on three data sets.
The first two datasets are real-world datasets – twitter
and skin segmentation5. The twitter data set consists
of a total of 193563 tweets collected using Twitter API
that all contained a latitude/longitude within a bounding
box of 50N, 125W and 30N, 110W (western USA) – about
2222 × 1442 square km. By setting the precision of lati-
tude/longitude coordinates to be 0.05, we obtain a 2D do-
main of size 400 × 300. The skin segmentation data set
consists of 245057 instances. Three ordinal attributes are
considered and they are B, G, R values from face images of
different classes. Each of them has a range from 0 to 255.
To understand the effect of Blowfish policies on datasets of
different sizes, we consider the full dataset skin, as well as
a 10% and 1% sub-sample (skin10, skin01) of the data.
The third dataset is a synthetic dataset where we generate
1000 points from (0, 1)4 with k randomly chosen centers and
a Gaussian noise with σ(0, 0.2) in each direction.
In Figures 1(a)-1(d), we report the ratio of the mean of
the objective value in Eqn. (10) between private clustering
methods including Laplace mechanism and Blowfish privacy
with Sd,θpairs, and the non-private k-means algorithm, for var-
ious values of  = {0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9, 1.0}. For all datasets,
d(·) is L1 (or Manhattan) distance. The number of itera-
tions is fixed to be 10 and the number of clusters is k = 4.
Each experiment is repeated 50 times to find mean, lower
and upper quartile. Figure 1(a) clusters according to lat-
itude/longitude of each tweet. We consider five different
policies: Gfull (Laplace mechanism), Gd,2000km, Gd,1000km,
Gd,500km, Gd,100km. Here, θ = 100km means that the adver-
sary cannot distinguish locations within a 20000 square km
region. Figure 1(b) clusters the 1% subsample skin01 based
on three attributes: B, G, R values and considers 5 policies
as well: Gfull, Gd,256, Gd,128, Gd,64 and Gd,32. Lastly, we
5
http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Skin+
Segmentation
also consider five policies for the synthetic dataset in Figure
1(c): Gfull, Gd,1.0, Gd,0.5, Gd,0.25, Gd,0.1.
From Figures 1(a)-1(c), we observe that the objective value
of Laplace mechanism could deviate up to 100 times away
from non-private method, but under Blowfish policies objec-
tive values could be less than 5 times that for non-private
k-means. Moreover, the error introduced by Laplace mech-
anism becomes larger with higher dimensionality – the ratio
for Laplace mechanism in Figure Figure 1(c) and 1(b) (4
and 3 dimensional resp.) is much higher than that in the
2D twitter dataset in Figure 1(a). From Figure 1(b), we
observe that the error introduced by private mechanisms do
not necessarily reduce monotonically as we reduce Blowfish
privacy protection (i.e. reduce θ). The same pattern is ob-
served in Figure 1(a) and Figure 1(c). One possible expla-
nation is that adding a sufficient amount of noise could be
helpful to get out of local minima for clustering, but adding
too much noise could lead to less accurate results.
To study the interplay between dataset size and Blowfish,
we plot (Figure 1(d)) for skin, skin10 and skin01 the ratio
of the objective value attained by the Laplace method to
the objective value attained by one of the Blowfish policies:
Gd,128. In all cases, we see an improvement in the objective
under Blowfish. The improvement in the objective is smaller
for larger  and larger datasets (since the Laplace mechanism
solution is close to the non-private solutions on skin).
Finally, Figures 1(e) and 1(f) summarize our results on
the Gattr and GP discriminative graphs. Figure 1(e) shows
that under the Gattr Blowfish policy, the error decreases by
an order of magnitude compared to the Laplace mechanism
for skin01 and the synthetic dataset due to higher dimen-
sionality and small dataset size. On the other hand, there is
little gain by using Gattr for the larger 2D twitter dataset.
Figure 1(f) shows ratio of the objective attained by the
private methods to that of the non-private k-means under
GP , for partitions P of different sizes. In each case, the
300x400 grid is uniformly divided; e.g., in partition|100,
we consider a uniform partitioning in 100 coarse cells, where
each new cell contains 30x40 cells from the original grid.
Thus an adversary will not be able to tell whether an indi-
vidual’s location was within an area spanned by the 30x40
cells (about 36,300 sq km). partition|120000 corresponds
to the original grid; thus we only protects pairs of locations
within each cell in the original grid (about 30 sq km). We
see that the objective value for Blowfish policies are smaller
than the objective values under Laplace mechanisms, sug-
gesting more accurate clustering. We also note that under
partition|120000, we can do the clustering exactly, since
the sensitivity of both qsize and qsum are 0.
To summarize, Blowfish policies allow us to effectively im-
prove utility by trading off privacy. In certain cases, we ob-
serve that Blowfish policies attain an objective value that is
close to 10 times smaller than that for the Laplace mech-
anism. The gap between Laplace and Blowfish policies in-
creases with dimensionality, and reduces with data size.
7. CUMULATIVE HISTOGRAMS
In this section, we develop novel query answering strate-
gies for two workloads – cumulative histograms and range
queries. Throughout this section, we will use Mean Squared
Error as a measure of accuracy/error defined in Def 2.4.
Definition 7.1 (Cumulative Histogram). Consider
a domain T = {x1, ..., x|T |} that has a total ordering x1 ≤
... ≤ x|T |. Let c(xi) denote the number of times xi appears
in the database D. Then, the cumulative histogram of T ,
denoted by ST (·) is a sequence of cumulative counts{
si | si =
i∑
j=1
c(xj), ∀i = 1, ..., |T |
}
(11)
Since we know the total size of the dataset |D| = n, di-
viding each cumulative count in ST (·) by n gives us the cu-
mulative distribution function (CDF) over T . Releasing the
CDF has many applications including computing quantiles
and histograms, answering range queries and constructing
indexes (e.g. k-d tree). This motivates us to design a mech-
anism for releasing cumulative histograms.
The cumulative histogram has a global sensitivity of |T |−
1 because all the counts in cumulative histogram except s|T |
will be reduced by 1 when a record in D changes from x1
to x|T |. Similar to k-means clustering, we could reduce the
sensitivity of cumulative histogram ST (·) by specifying the
sensitive information, such as SPpairs and Sd,θpairs. For this
section, we focus on Sd,θpairs, where d(·) is the L1 distance on
the domain and we assume that all the domains discussed
here have a total ordering.
7.1 Ordered Mechanism
Let us first consider a policy Pθ = (T , Gd,θ, In) with θ =
1. The discriminative secret graph is a line graph, Gd,1 =
(V,E), where V = T and E = {(xi, xi+1)|∀i = 1, ..., |T | − 1}.
This means that only adjacent domain values (xi, xi+1) ∈
T × T can form a secret pair. Therefore, the policy spe-
cific sensitivity of ST (·) for a line graph is 1. Based on this
small sensitivity, we propose a mechanism, named Ordered
Mechanism MOGd,1 to perturb cumulative histogram ST (·)
over line graph Gd,1 in the following way. For each si, we
add ηi ∼ Laplace( 1 ) to get s˜i to ensure (, P )-Blowfish pri-
vacy. Each s˜i has an error with an expectation equals to
2
2
. Note that Theorem 5.1 already ensures that releasing
s˜i’s satisfies (, P1)-Blowfish privacy. Furthermore, observe
that the counts in ST (·) are in ascending order. Hence, we
can boost the accuracy of S˜T (·) using constrained inference
proposed by Hay et al. in [9]. In this way, the new cu-
mulative histogram, denoted by SˆT (·), satisfies the ordering
constraint and has an error ESˆ = O( p log
3 |T |
2
), where p rep-
resents the number of distinct values in ST (·) [9]. Note that,
if we additionally enforce the constraint that s1 > 0, then
all the counts are also positive. In particular, when p = 1,
ESˆ = O( log
3 |T |
2
) and when p = |T |, ESˆ = O( |T |2 ). Many real
datasets are sparse, i.e. the majority of the domain values
have zero counts, and hence have fewer distinct cumulative
counts, i.e. p  |T |. This leads to much smaller ESˆ com-
pared to ES˜ . The best known strategy for releasing the cu-
mulative histogram is using the hierarchical mechanism [9],
which results in a total error of O( |T | log
3 |T |
2
). Moreover,
the SVD bound [16] suggests that no strategy can release
the cumulative histogram with O( |T |
2
) error. Thus under
the line graph policy, the Ordered Mechanism is a much
better strategy for cumulative histogram.
One important application of cumulative histogram is an-
swering range query, defined as follows.
Definition 7.2 (Range Query). Let D has domain
T = {x1, ..., x|T |}, where T has a total ordering. A range
query, denoted by q[xi, xj ] counts the number of tuples falling
within the range [xi, xj ] where xi, xj ∈ T and xi ≤ xj.
Range queries can be directly answered using cumulative
histogram SˆT (·), q[xi, xj ] = sˆj − sˆi−1. As each range query
requires at most two noisy cumulative counts, it has an er-
ror smaller than 2 · 2
2
(even without constrained inference).
Hence, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 7.1. Consider a policy (T , Gd,1, In), where Gd,1
is a line graph. Then the expected error of a range query
q[xi, xj ] for Ordered Mechanism is given by:
Eq[xi,xj ],MO
Gd,1
≤ 4/2 (12)
This error bound is independent of |T |, much lower than
the expected error using hierarchical structure with Laplace
mechanism to answer range queries, Eq[xi,xj ],lap = log
3 |T |
2
.
Again, the SVD bound [16] suggests that no differentially
private strategy can answer each range query with O( 1
2
) er-
ror. Other applications of ST (·) including computing quan-
tiles and histograms and constructing indexes (e.g. k-d tree)
could also use cumulative histogram in a similar manner as
range query to obtain a much smaller error by trading util-
ity with privacy under Gd,1. Next, we describe the ordered
hierarchical mechanism that works for general graphs, Gd,θ.
7.2 Ordered Hierarchical Mechanism
For a more general graph Gd,θ = (V,E), where V = T and
E = {(xi, xi±1), .., (xi, xi±θ)|∀i = 1, ..., |T |}, the sensitivity
of releasing cumulative histogram ST (·) becomes θ. The
Ordered Mechanism would add noise from Lap( θ

) to each
cumulative counts si. The total error in the released cumu-
lative histogram and range queries would still be asymptot-
ically smaller than the error achieved by any differentially
private mechanism for small θ. However, the errors become
comparable as the θ reaches log |T |, and the Ordered Mech-
anism’s error exceeds the error from the hierarchical mech-
anism when θ = O(log3/2 |T |). In this section, we present
(a) Ordered Hierarchical Tree θ = 4
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Figure 2: Ordered Hierarchical Mechanism. 2(a) gives an example of OH, where θ = 4. 2(b) and 2(c) shows
privacy-utility trade-offs for range query, using Gd,θ for sensitive information.
a hybrid strategy for releasing cumulative histograms (and
hence range queries), called Ordered Hierarchical Mecha-
nism, that always has an error less than or equal to the
hierarchical mechanism for all θ.
Various hierarchical methods have been proposed in the
literature [9, 19, 15, 20, 18]. A basic hierarchical struc-
ture is usually described as a tree with a regular fan-out f .
The root records the total size of the dataset D, i.e. the
answer to the range query q[x1, x|T |]. This range is then
partitioned into f intervals. If δ = d |T |
f
e, the intervals are
[x1, xδ], [xδ+1, x2δ],..., [x|T |−δ+1, x|T |] and answers to the
range queries over those intervals are recorded by the chil-
dren of the root node. Recursively, the interval represented
by the current node will be further divided into f subinter-
vals. Leaf nodes correspond to unit length interval q[xi, xi].
The height of the tree is h = dlogf |T |e. In the above con-
struction, the counts at level i are released using the Laplace
mechanism with parameter 2

, and
∑
i i = . Prior work has
considered distributing the  uniformly or geometrically [5].
We use uniform budgeting in our experiments.
Inspired by ordered mechanism for line graph, we propose
a hybrid structure, called Ordered Hierarchical Structure
OH for (, (T , Gd,θ, In))-Blowfish privacy. As shown in Fig-
ure 2(a), OH has two types of nodes, S nodes and H nodes.
The number of S nodes is k = dn
θ
e, which is dependent on
the threshold θ. In this way, we could guarantee a sensi-
tivity of 1 among the S nodes. Let us represent S nodes
as s1, ..., sk, where s1 = q[x1, xθ],..., sk−1 = q[x1, x(k−1)θ],
sk = q[x1, x|T |]. Note that the si nodes here are not the
same as the count for cumulative histogram, so we will use
range query q[x1, xi] to represent the count si in a cumula-
tive histogram. The first S node, s1 is the root of a subtree
consisting of H nodes. This subtree is denoted by H1 and
is used for answering all possible range queries within this
interval [x1, xθ]. For all 1 < i ≤ k, si has two children: si−1
and the root of a subtree made of H nodes, denoted by Hi.
Similarly, it also has a fan-out of f and represents counts for
values [(i− 1)θ+ 1, iθ]. We denote the height of the subtree
by h = dlogf θe. Using this hybrid structure, we could re-
lease cumulative counts in this way: q[x1, xlθ] + q[xlθ+1, xj ],
where lθ ≤ j < (l+ 1)θ. Here q[x1, xlθ] is answered using sl
and q[xlθ+1, xj ] is answered using Hl. Then any range query
could be answered as q[xi, xj ] = q[x1, xj ]− q[x1, xi−1].
Privacy Budgeting Strategy Given total privacy budget
, we denote the privacy budget assigned to all the S nodes
by S and to all the H nodes by H . When a tuple change
its value from x to y, where dG(x, y) ≤ θ , at most one S
node changes its count value and at most 2h H nodes change
their count values. Hence, for i = 2, ..., k, we add Laplace
noise drawn from Lap( 1
S
) to each si and we add Laplace
noise drawn from Lap( 2h
H
) to each H node in the subtree
Hi. As S1 is the root of H1, we assign  = S+H to the tree
H1 and hence we add Laplace noise drawn from Lap(
2h
H+S
)
to each H node in H1, including s1. In this way, we could
claim that this OH tree satisfies (, (T , Gd,θ, In))-Blowfish
privacy. When θ = |T |, H1 is going to be the only tree
to have all the privacy budget. This is equivalent to the
hierarchical mechanism for differential privacy.
Theorem 7.2. Consider a policy P = (T , Gd,θ, In). (1)
The Ordered Hierarchical structure satisfies (, P )-Blowfish
privacy. (2) The expected error of releasing a single count in
cumulative histogram or answering a range query this struc-
ture over T is ,
Eq[xi,xj ],MOH
Gd,θ
= O
(
|T | − θ
|T |2S
+
(f − 1) log3f θ
2H
)
(13)
Proof. (sketch) 1) Increasing count of x by 1 and de-
creasing count of y by 1, where d(x, y) < θ only affect the
counts of at most one S node and 2h H nodes. Since we
draw noise from Lap( 1
S
) for S nodes and from Lap( 2h
H
) for
H nodes (where  = S + H), we get (, P )-Blowfish privacy
based on sequential composition.
2) Consider all the counts in cumulative histogram, and
there are |T | of them, only |T |−θ requires S nodes. Each S
node has a error of 2
2
S
. This gives the first fraction in Eqn.
(13). On average, the number of H nodes used for each
count in cumulative histogram is bounded by the height of
the H tree and each H node has an error of 8h
2
2
H
, which
explains the second fraction in Eqn. (13).
Each range query q[xi, xj ] requires at most 2 counts from
cumulative histogram and its exact form of expected error
is shown below,
Eq[xi,xj ],MOH
Gd,θ
=
c1
2S
+
c2
2H
, (14)
where c1 =
4(|T |−θ)
|T |+1 and c2 =
8(f−1) logf θ3|T |
|T |+1 . Given θ and
f , at ∗S =
c
1/3
1
c
1/3
1 +c
1/3
2
, we obtain the minimum
E∗q[xi,xj ],MOH
Gd,θ
=
(c
1/3
1 + c
1/3
2 )
3
2
(15)
In particular, when θ = |T |, c1 = 0, this is equivalent to
the classical hierarchical mechanism without S nodes and
we have Eq[xi,xj ],MOH
Gd,θ
= O( log
3 |T |
2
). When θ = 1, c2 = 0,
this is the pure Ordered Mechanism without using H nodes
and Eq[xi,xj ],MOH
Gd,θ
= O( 1
2
).
Complexity Analysis The complexity of construction of
the hybrid tree OH and answering range query are O(|T |)
and O(log θ) respectively, where θ ≤ |T |, which is not worse
than the classical hierarchical methods.
7.3 Empirical Evaluation
We empirically evaluate the error of range queries for
the Ordered Hierarchical Mechanism with (, (T , Gd,θ, In))-
Blowfish privacy on two real-world datasets – adult and
twitter. The adult data set6 consists of Census records
of 48842 individuals. We consider the ordinal attribute cap-
ital loss with a domain size of 4357. The twitter data set
is the same dataset used for k-means clustering (Sec 6.1).
Here, in order to have a total ordering for the dataset, we
project the twitter data set on its latitude with a do-
main size of 400, around 2222 km. The fan-out f is set
to be 16 and each experiment is repeated 50 times. Fig-
ure 2(b) shows the mean square error E of 10000 random
range queries for various values of  = {0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9, 1.0}.
Seven threshold values θ = {full, 1000, 500, 100, 50, 10, 1}
are considered. For adult, for example, θ = 100 means the
adversary cannot distinguish between values of capital loss
within a range of 100 and θ = full means the adversary
cannot distinguish between all the domain values (same as
differential privacy). Figure 2(c) considers 4 threshold values
θ = {full, 500km, 50km, 5km} for twitter. When θ = 1
(adult) or θ = 5km (twitter), the ordered hierarchical
mechanism is same as the ordered mechanism. From both
figures, we see that as the θ increases, E decreases and orders
of magnitude difference in error between θ = 1 and θ = |T |.
8. BLOWFISH WITH CONSTRAINTS
In this section, we consider query answering under Blow-
fish policies with constraints P = (T , G, IQ), where (IQ (
In). In the presence of general deterministic constraints Q,
pairs of neighboring databases can differ in any number of
tuples, depending on structures of Q and the discriminative
graph G. Computing the policy specific sensitivity in this
general case is a hard problem, as shown next.
Theorem 8.1. Given a function f and a policy
P = (T , G, IQ). Checking whether S(f, P ) > 0 is NP-hard.
The same is true for the complete histogram query h.
Proof. (sketch) The proof follows from the hardness of
checking whether 3SAT has at least 2 solutions. The reduc-
tion uses I = {0, 1}n, constraints corresponding to clauses
in the formula, and {si0, si1}i as secret pairs.
Theorem 8.1 implies that checking whether S(f, P ) ≤ z is
co-NP-hard for general constraints Q. In fact, the hardness
6http://mlr.cs.umass.edu/ml/datasets/Adult
result holds even if we just consider the histogram query h
and general count query constraints.
Hence, in the rest of this section, we will focus on releas-
ing histograms under a large subclass of constraints called
sparse count query constraints. In Section 8.1 we show that
when the count query constraint is “sparse”, we can effi-
ciently compute S(h, P ), and thus we can use the Laplace
mechanism to release the histogram. In Section 8.2, we will
show that our general result about S(h, P ) subject to sparse
count query constraints can be applied to several important
practical scenarios.
8.1 Global Sensitivity for Sparse Constraints
A count query qφ returns the number of tuples satisfying
predicate φ in a database D, i.e., qφ(D) =
∑
t∈D 1φ(t)=true.
The auxiliary knowledge we consider here is a count query
constraint Q, which can be expressed as a conjunction of
query-answer pairs:
qφ1(D) = cnt1 ∧ qφ2(D) = cnt2 ∧ . . .∧ qφp(D) = cntp. (16)
Since the answers cnt1, cnt2, . . . , cntp do not affect our anal-
ysis, we denote the auxiliary knowledge or count query con-
straint as Q = {qφ1 , qφ2 , . . . , qφp}. Note that this class of
auxiliary knowledge is already very general and commonly
seen in practice. For example, marginals of contingency ta-
bles, range queries, and degree distributions of graphs can
all be expressed in this form.
Even for this class of constraints, calculating S(h, P ) is
still hard. In fact, the same hardness result in Theorem 8.1
holds for count query constraints (using a reduction from
the Vertex Cover problem).
8.1.1 Sparse Auxiliary Knowledge
Consider a secret pair (six, s
i
y) ∈ SGpairs about a tuple t
with t. id = i, and a count query qφ ∈ Q. If the tuple t ∈ D
changes from x to y, there are three mutually exclusive cases
about qφ(D): i) increases by one (¬φ(x)∧φ(y)), ii) decreases
by one (φ(x) ∧ ¬φ(y)), or iii) stays the same (otherwise).
Definition 8.1 (Lift and Lower). A pair (x, y) ∈ T ×
T is said to lift a count query qφ iff φ(x) = false ∧ φ(y) =
true, or lower qφ iff φ(x) = true ∧ φ(y) = false.
Note that one pair may lift or lower many count queries
simultaneously. We now define sparse auxiliary knowledge.
Definition 8.2 (Sparse Knowledge). The auxiliary
knowledge Q = {qφ1 , qφ2 , . . . , qφp} is sparse w.r.t. the dis-
criminative secret graph G = (V,E), iff each pair (x, y) ∈ E
lifts at most one count query in Q and lowers at most one
count query in Q.
Example 8.1. (Lift, Lower, and Sparse Knowledge) Con-
sider databases from domain T = A1 × A2 × A3, where
A1 = {a1, a2}, A2 = {b1, b2}, and A3 = {c1, c2, c3} and
count query constraint Q = {q1, q2, q3, q4} as in Figure 3(a).
With full-domain sensitive information, any pair in T × T
is a discriminative secret and thus the discriminative secret
graph G is a complete graph. A pair ((a1, b1, c1), (a2, b2, c2))
lifts q4 and lowers q1; and a pair ((a1, b2, c1), (a1, b2, c2))
neither lifts nor lowers a query. We can verify every pair
either (i) lifts exactly one query in Q and lowers exactly one
in Q, or (ii) lifts or lowers no query in Q. So Q is sparse
w.r.t. the discriminative secret graph G.
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q1 : t.A1 = a1 ∧ t.A2 = b1
q2 : t.A1 = a1 ∧ t.A2 = b2
q3 : t.A1 = a2 ∧ t.A2 = b1
q4 : t.A1 = a2 ∧ t.A2 = b2
q1 q2
q4q3
v+ v−
(a) Q = {q1, q2, q3, q4} (b) GP = (VP , EP )
Figure 3: Policy graph GP = (VP , EP ) of databases
with three attributes A1 = {a1, a2}, A2 = {b1, b2}, and
A3 = {c1, c2, c3} subject to count query constraint Q =
{q1, q2, q3, q4} and full-domain sensitive information
We will show that when the auxiliary knowledge Q is
sparse w.r.t. the discriminative secret graph G = (V,E)
in a policy P = (T , G, IQ), it is possible to analytically
bound the policy specific global sensitivity S(h, P ). To this
end, let’s first construct a directed graph called policy graph
GP = (VP , EP ) from P , the count queries in Q forming the
vertices, and the relationships between count queries and
secret pairs forming edges.
Definition 8.3 (Policy Graph). Given a policy P =
(T , G(V,E), IQ), and a sparse count constraint Q, the policy
graph GP = (VP , EP ) is a directed graph, where
• VP = Q∪{v+, v−}: Create a vertex for each count query
qφ ∈ Q, and two additional special vertices v+ and v−.
• EP : i) add a directed edge (qφ, qφ′) iff there exists a secret
pair (x, y) ∈ E lifting qφ′ and lowering qφ; ii) add a
directed edge (v+, qφ) iff there is a secret pair in E lifting
qφ but not lowering any other qφ′ ; iii) add a directed edge
(qφ, v
−) iff there is a secret pair in E lowering qφ but not
lifting any other qφ′ ; and iv) add edge (v
+, v−).
Let α(GP ) denote the length (number of edges) of the
longest simple cycle in GP . α(GP ) is defined to be 0 if GP
has no directed cycle. Let ξ(GP ) be the length (number of
edges) of a longest simple path from v+ to v− in GP .
Example 8.2. (Policy Graph) Followed by Example 8.1,
since the count query constraint Q is sparse w.r.t. the dis-
criminative secret graph, we have its policy graph GP =
(VP , EP ) as in Figure 3(b). For example, a pair ((a1, b1, c1),
(a2, b2, c2)) in T × T lifts q4 and lowers q1, so there is an
edge (q1, q4). There is no edge from v
+ or to v−, except
(v+, v−), because every pair in T × T either lifts one query
and lowers one, or lifts/lowers no query. In this policy graph
GP , we have α(GP ) = 4 and ξ(GP ) = 1.
Theorem 8.2. Let h be the complete histogram query. In
a policy P = (T , G, IQ), if the auxiliary knowledge Q is
sparse w.r.t. G, then we have:
S(h, P ) ≤ 2 max{α(GP ), ξ(GP )},
If there exist two neighboring databases (D1, D2) ∈ N(P )
s.t. ||h(D1) − h(D2)||1 = 2|T (D1, D2)| when |T (D1, D2)| =
max(D′,D′′)∈N(P ) |T (D′, D′′)|, then we have the equality:
S(h, P ) = 2 max{α(GP ), ξ(GP )}.
Proof. See Appendix.
For count query constraint Q that is sparse with respect
to policy P = (T , G, IQ), we have the following immediate
corollary about an upper bound.
Corollary 8.3. In a policy P = (T , G, IQ), if Q is sparse
w.r.t. G, then S(h, P ) ≤ 2 max{|Q|, 1}.
Thus, drawing noise from Laplace(2 max{|Q|, 1}/) suffices
(but may not be necessary) for releasing the complete his-
togram while ensuring (, P )-Blowfish privacy.
8.2 Applications
The problem of calculating α(GP ) and ξ(GP ) exactly in
a general policy graph GP is still a hard problem, but be-
comes tractable in a number of practical scenarios. We give
three such examples: i) the policy specific global sensitivity
S(h, P ) subject to auxiliary knowledge of one marginal for
full-domain sensitive information; ii) S(h, P ) subject to aux-
iliary knowledge of multiple marginals for attribute sensitive
information; and iii) S(h, P ) subject to auxiliary knowledge
of range queries for distance-threshold sensitive information.
8.2.1 Marginals and Full-domain Secrets
Marginals are also called cuboids in data cubes. Intu-
itively, in a marginal or a cuboid C, we project the database
of tuples onto a subset of attributes [C] ⊆ {A1, A2, . . . , Ak}
and count the number of tuples that have the same values
on these attributes. Here, we consider the scenario when
the adversaries have auxiliary knowledge about one or more
marginals, i.e., the counts in some marginals are known.
Definition 8.4 (Marginal). Given a database D of
n tuples from a k-dim domain T = A1 × A2 × . . . × Ak, a
d-dim marginal C is the (exact) answer to the query:
SELECT Ai1 , Ai2 , . . . , Aid , COUNT(∗) FROM D
GROUP BY Ai1 , Ai2 , . . . , Aid
Let [C] denote the set of d attributes {Ai1 , Ai2 , . . . , Aid}.
A marginal [C] = {Ai1 , Ai2 , . . . , Aid} is essentially a set
of count queries Cq = {qφ}, where the predicate φ(t) :=
(t.Ai1 = ai1) ∧ (t.Ai2 = ai2) ∧ . . . ∧ (t.Ai2 = aid), for all
possible (ai1 , ai2 , . . . , aid) ∈ Ai1 ×Ai2 × . . .×Aid .
Let A = {A1, A2, . . . , Ak} be the set of all attributes. For
a marginal C, define size(C) =
∏
Ai∈[C] |Ai|, where |Ai| is
the cardinality of an attribute Ai. So size(C) is the number
of possible rows in the marginal C, or the number of the
count queries in Cq constructed as above.
Suppose a marginal with [C] ( A is known to the adver-
sary. Let IQ(C) denote the set of databases with marginal
C equal to certain value. Recall that we want to publish
the complete histogram h of a database D from a domain
T = A1×A2× . . .×Ak. For the full-domain sensitive infor-
mation, using Theorem 8.2, we have the global sensitivity
equal to 2 size(C).
Theorem 8.4. Let h be the complete histogram. For a
policy P = (T , G, IQ(C)), where G represents the full-domain
sensitive information Sfullpairs and [C] ( A is a marginal, we
have S(h, P ) = 2 size(C).
Proof. (sketch) Consider the set of count queries Cq.
It is not hard to show that Cq is sparse w.r.t. the com-
plete graph G. So we can construct a policy graph from
(T , G, ICq), which is a complete graph with vertex set Cq.
From Theorem 8.2, we have S(f, P ) = 2|Cq| = 2 size(C).
The upper bound S(h, P ) ≤ 2|Cq| is directly from Theo-
rem 8.2, and it is not hard to construct two neighboring
databases to match this upper bound as [C] ( A.
Example 8.3. Continuing with Example 8.2, note that
the constraints in Figure 3(a) correspond to the marginal
[C] = {A1, A2}. So from (i) in Theorem 8.2, we have
S(h, P ) ≤ 2 × 4 = 8. The worst case S(h, P ) = 8 can
be verified by considering the two neighboring databases D1
and D2, each with four rows: a1b1c1 (in D1)/a1b2c2 (in D2),
a1b2c1/a2b1c2, a2b1c1/a2b2c2, and a2b2c1/a1b1c2.
8.2.2 Marginals and Attribute Secrets
Now suppose a set of p marginals C1, . . . , Cp with [C1],
. . . , [Cp] ( {A1, A2, . . . , Ak} are auxiliary knowledge to the
adversary. Let IQ(C1,...,Cp) be the set of databases with
these p marginals equal to certain values. For the attribute
sensitive information, if the p marginals are disjoint, using
Theorem 8.2 the global sensitivity is 2 max1≤i≤p size(Ci).
Theorem 8.5. Let h be the complete histogram. Con-
sider a policy P = (T , Gattr, IQ(C1,...,Cp)), where [Ci] ( A
for any marginal Ci, and [Ci]∩ [Cj ] = ∅ for any two Ci and
Cj. Then we have S(h, P ) = 2 max1≤i≤p size(Ci).
Proof. (sketch) Consider the set of count queries Q =
Cq1 ∪ . . . ∪ Cqp, it is not hard to show that Q is sparse w.r.t.
Gattr. The policy graph from (T , Gattr, Q) is the union of p
cliques with vertex sets Cq1, . . . , C
q
p. From Theorem 8.2, we
have S(h, P ) = 2 maxi |Cqi | = 2 maxi size(Ci). The upper
bound S(h, P ) ≤ 2 maxi |Cqi | is directly from Theorem 8.2,
and it is not hard to construct two neighboring databases to
match this upper bound as [Ci] 6= A.
8.2.3 Grid and Distance-threshold Secrets
Our general theorem about S(f, P ) can be also applied to
databases with geographical information.
Consider a domain T = [m]k, where [m] = {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
When k = 2 or 3, T can be used to approximately en-
code a 2-dim plane or a 3-dim space. For two points x, y ∈
T , we define distance d(x, y) to be the Lp distance ||x −
y||p. For two point sets X,Y ⊂ T , we define d(X,Y ) =
minx∈X,y∈Y d(x, y). A geographical database D consists of
n points, each of which is drawn from the domain T and
may represent the location of an object.
Define a rectangle R = [l1, u1] × [l2, u2] × . . . × [lk, uk],
where li ∈ [m], ui ∈ [m], and li ≤ ui. A range count query
qR returns the number of tuples whose locations fall into the
rectangle R. R is called a point query if li = ui for all i.
In this scenario, suppose the answers to a set of p range
count queries are known to the adversary. So we can repre-
sent the auxiliary knowledge as Q = {qR1 , qR2 , . . . , qRp}.
Also, suppose we aim to protect the distance-threshold sen-
sitive information Sd,θpairs= {(six, siy) | d(x, y) ≤ θ} while the
publishing complete histogram h.
Using Theorem 8.2, we can calculate the global sensitivity
if all rectangles are disjoint, i.e., Ri∩Rj = ∅ for any i 6= j, as
follows. Construct a graph GR(Q) = (VR, ER) on the set of
rectangles in Q: i) create a vertex in VR for rectangle Ri in
each range count query qRi inQ; and ii) add an edge (Ri, Rj)
into ER iff d(Ri, Rj) ≤ θ. We can prove that the policy
specific global sensitivity equals to 2(maxcomp(Q)+1) when
there are no point query constraints, where maxcomp(Q) is
the number of nodes in the largest connected component in
GR(Q). Note that maxcomp(Q) (and hence S(h, P )) can be
computed efficiently.
Theorem 8.6. Let h be the complete histogram. For a
policy P = (T , G, IQ), where T = [m]k, G represents the
distance-threshold sensitive information Sd,θpairs (θ > 0), and
Q is a set of disjoint range count queries {qR1 , qR2 , . . . ,
qRp} with Ri ∩ Rj = ∅ for i 6= j. We have S(h, P ) ≤
2(maxcomp(Q) + 1). If none of the constraints are point
queries, then S(h, P ) = 2(maxcomp(Q) + 1).
9. CONCLUSIONS
We propose a new class of privacy definitions, called Blow-
fish privacy, with the goal of seeking better trade-off be-
tween privacy and utility. The key feature of Blowfish is
a policy, where users can specify sensitive information that
needs to be protected and knowledge about their databases
which has been released to potential adversaries. Such a rich
set of “tuning knobs” in the policy enable users to improve
the utility by customizing sensitive information and to limit
attacks from adversaries with auxiliary knowledge. Using
examples of kmeans clustering, cumulative histograms and
range queries, we show how to tune utility using reasonable
policies with weaker specifications of privacy. For the latter,
we develop strategies that are more accurate than any dif-
ferentially private mechanism. Moreover, we study how to
calibrate noise for Blowfish policies with count constraints
when publishing histograms, and the general result we ob-
tain can be applied in several practical scenarios.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOF OF THEOREM 7.1
Proof. (sketch) Recall that the policy specific global sen-
sitivity is defined as
S(h, P ) = max
(D1,D2)∈N(P )
||h(D1)− h(D2)||1.
Direction I (S(h, P ) ≤ 2 max{α(GP ), ξ(GP )}). It suf-
fices to prove that for any two databases D1, D2 ∈ IQ,
if |T (D1, D2)| > max{α(GP ), ξ(GP )}, there must exist an-
other database D3 ∈ IQ s.t. T (D1, D3) ( T (D1, D2), i.e.,
(D1, D2) /∈ N(P ); and thus for any two databases (D1, D2) ∈
N(P ), we have ||h(D1)−h(D2)||1 ≤ 2|T (D1, D2)| ≤ 2 max{α(GP ),
ξ(GP )} which implies S(h, P ) ≤ 2 max{α(GP ), ξ(GP )}.
To complete the proof, we consider two databasesD1, D2 ∈
IQ with |T (D1, D2)| > max{α(GP ), ξ(GP )}, and show how
to construct the D3 defined above.
First of all, for any secret pair (six, s
i
y) ∈ T (D1, D2), it
must lift and/or lower some count query qφ ∈ Q; otherwise,
we can construct D3 by changing the value of tuple t with
t. id = i in D1 into its value in D2.
To constructD3, now let’s consider a directed graph GD1|D2 =
(VD1|D2 , ED1|D2), where VD1|D2 ⊆ VP and ED1|D2 is a multi-
subset of EP (i.e., an edge in EP may appear multiple times in
ED1|D2). ED1|D2 is constructed as follows: for each (six, siy) ∈
T (D1, D2), i) if (x, y) lifts qφ′ and lowers qφ, add a directed
edge (qφ, qφ′) into ED1|D2 ; ii) if (x, y) lifts qφ but not low-
ering any other qφ′ , add an edge (v
+, qφ); and iii) if (x, y)
lowers qφ but not lifting any other qφ′ , add an edge (qφ, v
−).
VD1|D2 is the set of count queries involved in ED1|D2 .
GD1|D2 is Eulerian, i.e., each vertex has the same in-degree
as out-degree except v+ and v− (if existing in GD1|D2), be-
cause of the above construction and the fact that D1, D2 ∈
IQ. As |ED1|D2 | = |T (D1, D2)| > max{α(GP ), ξ(GP )} (i.e.,
GD1|D2 is larger than any simple cycle or simple v+-v− path
in GP ) and GD1|D2 is Eulerian, GD1|D2 must have a proper
subgraph which is either a simple cycle or a simple v+-v−
path. Let ED1→D2 be the edge set of this simple cycle/path.
Construct D3 that is identical to D1, except that for each
secret pair (six, s
i
y) associated with each edge in ED1→D2 , the
value of tuple t with t. id = i is changed from x to y. We
can show that D3 satisfies its definition, and thus the proof
for Direction I is completed.
Direction II (S(h, P ) ≥ 2 max{α(GP ), ξ(GP )}). Let’s first
prove a weaker inequality:
max
(D1,D2)∈N(P )
|T (D1, D2)| ≥ max{α(GP ), ξ(GP )}. (17)
It implies S(h, P ) ≥ 2 max{α(GP ), ξ(GP )} if the condition
in (ii) of the theorem holds. Combined with Direction I, we
can conclude S(h, P ) = 2 max{α(GP ), ξ(GP )}.
To prove (17), it suffices to show that for any simple
cycle/v+-v− path in GP , we can construct two databases D1
and D2 s.t. (D1, D2) ∈ N(P ) and |T (D1, D2)| = its length.
Consider a simple cycle qφ1 , qφ2 , . . . , qφl , qφl+1 = qφ1 .
Starting with any database D ∈ IQ, let D1 ← D and
D2 ← D initially. For each edge (qφi , qφi+1), from the defini-
tion of policy graphs, we can find a secret pair (x, y) ∈ E(G)
s.t. (¬qφi(x) ∧ qφi(y)) ∧
(
qφi+1(x) ∧ ¬qφi+1(y)
)
; create two
new tuples: t1. id = t2. id = i, t1 = x, and t2 = y; and
then let D1 ← D1 ∪ {t1} and D2 ← D2 ∪ {t2}. It is not
hard to verify that finally we get two databases D1 and D2
s.t. (D1, D2) ∈ N(P ) and |T (D1, D2)| = cycle length. The
proof is similar for a simple v+-v− path.
B. PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
Proof. (sketch) Let MM1,M2 denote the mechanism that
outputting the results of M1 and M2 sequentially. As M1
satisfies (1, P )-Blowfish privacy, for every pair of neigh-
boring databases (Da, Db) ∈ N(P ), and every result r1 ∈
range(M1), we have
Pr[M1(Da) = r1] ≤ e1Pr[M1(Db) = r1] (18)
The result of M1 is outputted before the result of M2, so r1
will turn out to be another input of M2, together with the
original dataset. As M1 satisfies (1, P )-Blowfish privacy, for
every pair of neighboring databases (Da, Db) ∈ N(P ) cou-
pling with the same r1, and for every result r2 ∈ range(M2),
we have
Pr[M2(Da, r1) = r2] ≤ e1Pr[M2(Db, r1) = r2] (19)
Therefore, for every pair of neighboring databases (Da, Db) ∈
N(P ), and every set of output sequence (r1, r2), we have
Pr[MM1,M2(Da) = (r1, r2)]
= Pr[M1(Da) = r1]Pr[M2(Da, r1) = r2]
≤ e1Pr[M1(Db) = r1]e2Pr[M2(Db, r1) = r2]
≤ e1+2Pr[M1(Db) = r1]Pr[M2(Db, r1) = r2]
= e1+2Pr[MM1,M2(Db) = (r1, r2)] (20)
C. PROOF OF THEOREM 4.2-4.3
Proof. (sketch) For every pair of neighboring databases
(Da, Db) ∈ N(P ) with the cardinality constraint or with
disjoint subsets of constraints Q1, ..., Qp, there is only one
subset of ids, let’s say Si∗, with different values in Da and
Db while Da ∩ Si = Db ∩ Si for all i 6= i∗. Hence, for every
set of output sequence r,
Pr[M(Da) = r] =
∏
i
Pr[Mi(Da ∩ Si) = ri]
≤ ei∗Pr[Mi∗(Db ∩ Si∗) = ri∗ ]
∏
i,i 6=i∗
Pr[Mi(Db ∩ Si) = ri]
≤ emaxi i
∏
i
Pr[Mi(Db ∩ Si) = ri]
= emaxi iPr[M(Db) = r] (21)
